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1. OPENNESS, TRANSPARENCY AND THE RIGHT TO ACCESS 
DOCUMENTS IN THE EU  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon, in force since December 2009, includes a number of reforms 
emphasising open-decision making, citizen participation and the role of transparency and 
good administration in building up the democratic credentials of the European Union (EU). 
As regards democratic decision-making and transparency in particular, a specific Title in the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU) now includes a number of core provisions on democratic 
principles, applicable in all areas of Union action. They underline the principle of 
representative democracy through the European Parliament, representing the citizens 
directly at Union level, and through the governments forming the European Council and the 
Council and that are democratically accountable either to their national parliaments, or to 
their citizens.1 Even participatory democracy enjoys a pivotal role in the new Treaty 
framework; in order to guarantee the right of ’every citizen’ to ’participate in the democratic 
life of the Union’, the Treaty establishes that ’[d]ecisions shall be taken as openly and as 
closely as possible to the citizen’ and that both citizens and representatives should be given 
opportunities to ’make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action’.2 
These provisions have a linkage both with the new citizens’ initiative3 and with Article 15 
TFEU, which places the legislature under an obligation to act publicly, and establishes that 
citizens have the right to access documents held by all Union institutions, bodies and 
agencies. The right of access to documents, and its nature as a fundamental right, is further 
emphasised by Article 42 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which now enjoys ‘the 
same legal value as the Treaties’.4  
In practice, open decision-making is to a large extent realised through the right of the general 
public to access documents. Regulation No 1049/2001 on public access to documents held 
by the EU institutions (Access Regulation),5 builds on the principle of ‘widest possible access’, 
and has together with case law been instrumental in operationalising the right of citizen 
access by establishing procedures and standards for the exercise of their democratic rights. 
All documents held by the European Parliament, Council and Commission are public, as the 
main principle, but certain public and private interests are protected through specific 
exceptions under Article 4. But as exceptions derogate from the principle of the widest 
possible public access to documents, they must, according to established case-law, be 
interpreted and applied narrowly.6  
Article 15(3) TFEU extends the public right of access to documents of all the Union 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. The Court of Justice, the European Central Bank 
and the European Investment Bank are subject to this provision only when exercising their 
administrative tasks. The original 2001 Regulation only directly applies to the European 
Parliament, the Council, and the Commission. However, its application has been extended to 
the agencies by virtue of a specific provision in their respective founding acts. Furthermore, 
a number of institutions and bodies have adopted voluntary acts laying down rules on access 
to their documents which are identical or similar to Regulation No 1049/2001. 
                                           
1 Article 10(1) and (2) TEU. 
2 Article 10(3) TEU, Article 11 TEU. 
3 See Regulation No 211/2011 on the citizens’ initiative, OJ L [2011] 65/1. 
4 Article 6(1) TEU. 
5 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, OJ L 145/43. 
6 See e.g. C-280/11 P Council v Access Info Europe para 30 and the case law quoted in the paragraph. 
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It has been 15 years since the adoption of Regulation No 1049/2001. In the same time frame 
the Commission and the Council set about adopting internal rules based on their rules of 
procedure on security and other classifications for documents. Such rules continue to exist 
in amended form today and exist alongside the legislative rules on access to documents. 
Discussions on the reform of Regulation No 1049/2001 have been pending since 2008.7 While 
one would think that the tendency was – in line with the recent Treaty reforms – to strengthen 
the rights of citizens further, in fact the opposite seems to be the case, with discussions on 
reform mainly circulating around new ways to limit citizen access,8 many of them in rather 
fundamental ways that seem to be at odds with the letter of the Treaties. These discussions 
bear witness to what seems to be a change of paradigm and priorities. The tendency since 
the Treaty of Maastricht has been to strengthen the rights of citizens,9 now this objective 
seems lees squarely at the forefront of either the policy agenda or actual institutional 
practice. Staffan Dahllöf, a journalist specialising in freedom of information, describes the 
situation as follows:  
The voices asking for openness and citizen's involvement are today weaker and fewer 
than they were when the present rules were decided in 2001 - at least amongst the 
Member State governments, and definitely in the Commission. It's more like the 
Empire strikes back.10 
Since there is a complete impasse in the legislative procedure (already for a very long time) 
on amending the 2001 Regulation, the role of the CJEU is very much centre-stage with 
litigants attempting to challenge a range of embedded secretive practices across a range of 
institutions and tasks.11 From a democratic point of view this can be considered problematic 
as it shifts responsibility from the EU legislator to the courts who cannot re-design the system 
in the required manner but deal with issues on a case by case basis, as and when they are 
brought before it. The same applies to the European Ombudsman, although her work is 
increasingly significant in bringing specific secretive practices to light and tackling them both 
on a case by case basis and more structurally through a growing number of own initiative 
enquiries. Keeping in mind Dahllöf’s accurate observation quoted above, opening 
negotiations on the reform of Regulation No 1049/2001 naturally brings with it a risk of 
discussions leading to a further tightening of the EU transparency regime. The current 
Commission is not necessarily positively disposed to increasing transparency (as evidenced 
in legal observations before the CJEU in particular), and it has the backup of the majority of 
Member States in the Council. Despite this, we think that there should be an open discussion 
about the possibilities of increasing openness. If this proves to be impossible, the Parliament 
can always block any reform that could result in negative outcomes or a levelling down.  
In this note we discuss recent developments in jurisprudence and the challenges that 
currently exist in the application of the Regulation No 1049/2001 with a focus on public access 
by citizens. We conclude with a number of policy recommendations for consideration.  
                                           
7 See e.g. Ian Harden, ‘The Revision of Regulation 1049/2001 on Public Access to Documents’, 15(2) European 
Public Law (2009) 239-256. 
8 See the open letter by Beatrice Ask, Minister for Justice, Sweden and Anna-Maja Henriksson, Minister of Justice, 
Finland, published at http://www.wobbing.eu/sites/default/files/Open%20letter.pdf. 
9 For one account of the EU’s transparency development so far, see Deirdre Curtin, ’Judging EU Secrecy’, Cahiers 
de Droit Européen, 2012 (2) 459 – 490. 
10 Staffan Dahllöf, ‘Guide to the battle of transparency – UPDATED’, 09/06/2012, available at the EU wobbing 
website http://www.wobbing.eu/news/guide-battle-transparency-%E2%80%93-updated. On the varying 
positions of the Member States to the reform process, see M.Z. Hillebrandt, D.M. Curtin and A.J. Meijer, 
‘Transparency in the EU Council of Ministers: An Institutional Analysis’, 20(1) European Law Journal, 2014, 1-
20. 
11 For a discussion, see Päivi Leino, “Transparency, Participation and EU Institutional Practice: An Inquiry into the 
Limits of the ‘Widest Possible’”, EUI Working Paper (LAW 3/2014). 
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2. CASE LAW AND DEVELOPMENTS IN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
An analysis of the case law of the CJEU over the past decade can largely be positive with a 
number of very key judgments finding in favour of those challenging secretive practices, with 
the Court adopting a constitutional and wide democratic perspective on the salience of the 
principle of access to documents for citizens. In its case-law, the CJEU has in principle 
required that documents should be examined one-by-one in accordance with the basic 
principle of the Regulation stemming from Article 4(6). When assessing possible harm to the 
interests protected by the Regulation, the risk of that interest being undermined must be 
reasonably foreseeable and not purely hypothetical.12  
Another significant question discussed in recent case law relates to the ‘public interest’ test 
included in the exceptions under Article 4(2) and 4(3) of the Regulation13 requiring the 
institution to balance the possible harm with the public interest in disclosure and consider 
whether access could still be granted despite some harm to the protected interests. The Court 
has constructed a three-stage test requiring the institution to first identify and verify the 
parts of the document that contain information covered by an exception; then examine 
whether disclosure of the parts of the document would undermine an interest; and thirdly, 
when a public interest test applies to the exception if there is an overriding public interest 
justifying the disclosure.14 However, it is difficult to identify a case where the Court would 
have been convinced about the existence of a public interest in disclosure that would have 
effectively reversed the outcome, even if attempts have been made for example in relation 
to environmental matters (LPN case), the use of public funds (Dennekamp), the protection 
of public health (Spirlea) and constitutional issues (Besselink). Therefore, the difference to 
the exceptions laid down by Article 4(1), where no public interest test is required, is not 
particularly remarkable. In relation to the Article 4(1) exceptions the Court has stood very 
firm that no consideration of a possible public interest in disclosure needs to be considered. 15 
Recent case law includes in particular examples relating to the protection of privacy and 
international relations, to be further discussed below.  
The CJEU in recent case law is re-enforcing a questionable distinction between documents 
relating to legislative procedures and other documents. In addition to legislative documents, 
our focus in this briefing note is on administrative documents (including documents relating 
to infringement and EU Pilot procedures), Court pleadings and documents relating to 
international relations. In addition, we consider the balance between transparency and data 
protection in the Courts’ recent case law. The institutions under challenge, in particular the 
Commission and the Council have continued to resist efforts to get them to change practices 
and to challenge (and even re-challenge) cases they lose at first instance or even on appeal. 
Court jurisprudence also demonstrates that in many instances the Access Regulation, 
intended to secure the right of the general public to gain access to documents held by the 
institutions, is in practice frequently used by parties to individual administrative or judicial 
proceedings. This demonstrates that privileged access – which parties should enjoy in relation 
to their own file and specifically protected under Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental 
                                           
12 Ibid, paras 37-38, 40 and 44. 
13 The Article 4(2) exceptions involving the public interest test include the protection of commercial interests of a 
natural or legal person, including intellectual property; court proceedings and legal advice; and the purpose of 
inspections, investigations and audits. In addition, the Article 4(3) ‘space to think’ exception includes the test.  
14 Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Sweden and Turco v Council EU:C:2008:374, para 43, in relation to legal 
advice. 
15 The Article 4(1) exceptions include the public interest as regards public security, defence and military matters, 
international relations, the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a Member State; and 
the privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community legislation regarding 
the protection of personal data. 
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Rights is currently not secured in Union legislation. This matter should be addressed on a 
horizontal basis by the Regulation on Administrative Procedure to be adopted on the basis of 
Article 298 TFEU.16  
 
2.1. Legislative documents 
 
The main principle in the Treaty of Lisbon is clear: the Council and the European Parliament 
are to legislate in the open. The last sentence of Article 15 TFEU also places the European 
Parliament and the Council under an obligation to ensure the publication of the documents 
relating to the legislative procedures. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, legislative matters are 
defined with reference to the applicable decision-making procedure, either the ordinary or 
special legislative one, and not the effects or title of the acts. For the Council’s part this 
means that it meets ‘in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act’, in 
practice through the Council’s internet site ‘by audiovisual means, notably in an overflow 
room and through broadcasting in all official languages […] using videostreaming’.17 Open 
meetings have a linkage with access to documents, since documents submitted to the Council 
open sessions and the relevant minutes are made public.  
Regulation No 1049/2001 has not been updated since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty, but it does include some references to legislative documents. Article 12 relates to 
direct access in electronic form or through a register. Its paragraph 2 establishes that ‘[in 
particular, legislative documents, that is to say, documents drawn up or received in the 
course of procedures for the adoption of acts which are legally binding in or for the Member 
States, should, subject to Articles 4 and 9, be made directly accessible’. In practice this 
entails that legislative documents should become accessible automatically, and not only 
following a specific request. Article 12 of the Regulation links with paragraph 6 of the 
preamble, which stipulates that 
Wider access should be granted to documents in cases where the institutions are acting 
in their legislative capacity, including under delegated powers, while at the same time 
preserving the effectiveness of the institutions' decision-making process. Such 
documents should be made directly accessible to the greatest possible extent. 
These provisions were subject to the Court’s jurisprudence already pre-Lisbon, most notably 
in its landmark ruling in Turco, which clearly lays down the main principle of public access 
and its linkage with the principle of democracy: 
it is for the Council to balance the particular interest to be protected by non-disclosure 
of the document concerned against, inter alia, the public interest in the document 
being made accessible in the light of the advantages stemming […] from increased 
openness, in that this enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-
making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and 
is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system. Those 
considerations are clearly of particular relevance where the Council is acting in its 
legislative capacity […]. Openness in that respect contributes to strengthening 
democracy by allowing citizens to scrutinize all the information which has formed the 
basis of a legislative act. The possibility for citizens to find out the considerations 
                                           
16 See P Leino, “Efficiency, citizens and administrative culture. The politics of good administration in the EU”, 4 
European Public Law (2014) 681-710.  
17 Council Decision of 1 December 2009 adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure, OJ L 325/35. See in particular, 
Article 7 ‘Legislative procedure and openness’.  
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underpinning legislative action is a precondition for the effective exercise of their 
democratic rights.18  
The Court expressly stated that ‘Regulation No 1049/2001 imposes, in principle, an obligation 
to disclose the opinions of the Council’s legal service relating to a legislative process’ (para 
68 of the ruling). According to the Court, access can be denied in exceptional cases if the 
advice is ‘of a particularly sensitive nature or having a particularly wide scope that goes 
beyond the context of the legislative process in question’. However, even then the refusal 
needs to be reasoned in detail and be only applied ‘for the period during which protection is 
justified on the basis of the content of the document’ (paras 69-70). However, the Council 
continues to limit access to legal service opinions given in the context of the legislative 
procedure,19 in line with its Rules of Procedure, which have not been updated to reflect the 
Turco jurisprudence.  
Post-Lisbon, the Court has had the opportunity to interpret the relevance of the ‘space to 
think’ exception in Article 4(3), relating to situations where a decision has not yet been taken 
by the institution, in the legislative context. Access Info Europe, an NGO promoting freedom 
of information in the EU, requested access to a legislative document including footnotes 
indicating the positions of individual Member States. The central question was whether access 
to Member State positions negatively impacts the effectiveness of decision-making and if 
yes, which one should take priority, effectiveness or openness. The Council lost the case in 
the General Court and appealed to the Court of Justice20 arguing that the General Court’s 
reading had attached ‘undue and excessive weight to the transparency of the decision-
making process, without taking any account of the needs associated with the effectiveness 
of that process’. It moreover disregarded the balanced approach laid down both in primary 
law and secondary law to the relationship between the two objectives. The Council argued 
that ‘its legislative process is very fluid and requires a high level of flexibility on the part of 
Member States so that they can modify their initial position, thus maximising the chances of 
reaching an agreement’. In the Council’s view, identifying the delegations was not necessary 
for ensuring a democratic debate.  
The CJEU rejected this with reference to how full access can be limited only if there is a 
genuine risk that the protected interests might be undermined. The high standard of proof 
required to establish that level of harm makes it almost impossible to rely on Article 4(3) in 
this context. In particular, according to the Court, 
...the various proposals for amendment or re-drafting made by the four Member State 
delegations which are described in the requested document are part of the normal 
legislative process, from which it follows that the requested documents could not be 
regarded as sensitive – not solely by reference to the criterion concerning the 
involvement of a fundamental interest of the European Union or of the Member States, 
but by reference to any criterion whatsoever (para 63). 
Access to legislative documents continues to occupy the Court. Emilio De Capitani, the 
previous head of the LIBE Committee Secretariat, has lodged an appeal against the European 
Parliament’s decision to refuse full access to documents relating to a legislative proposal, in 
particular as regards documents relating to trilogues.21 De Capitani argues in essence that 
granting access to them would not specifically, effectively and in a non-hypothetical manner 
                                           
18 Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P Kingdom of Sweden and Maurizio Turco v the Council, paras 45-46 
19 This is also reflected in jurisprudence, see e.g. T-452/10 ClientEarth v Council; T-303/13 Miettinen v the 
Council; T-395/13 Miettinen v Council.   
20 C-280/11 P Council v Access Info Europe. 
21 Case T-540/15, De Capitani v European Parliament. 
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undermine the legislative decision-making process, and that notably after the Lisbon Treaty, 
legislative preparatory documents are subject to the principle of widest possible access. 
The General Court has also recently had the opportunity in ClientEarth to address the 
question of whether documents relating to impact assessments produced before the adoption 
of a Commission legislative procedure should be public or not.22 The Commission had refused 
access with reference to how disclosure would restrict its room for manoeuvre and reduce its 
ability to reach a compromise, and create external pressures hindering delicate decision-
making processes. The Commission invoked a ‘general presumption’ of secrecy (see below). 
The Court accepted that a general presumption was indeed necessary, ‘having regard to the 
rules governing the preparation and development of policy proposals by the Commission, 
including, where appropriate, proposals for legislative acts’ (para 78). For this reason, 
This is all the more important in order to preserve the essence of the power of initiative 
conferred on the Commission by the Treaties and its capacity to assess, wholly 
independently, the appropriateness of a policy proposal. More specifically, it is 
important to protect that power of initiative from any influences exerted by public or 
private interests which would attempt, outside of organised consultations, to compel 
the Commission to adopt, amend or abandon a policy initiative and which would thus 
prolong or complicate the discussion taking place within that institution (para 95). 
Consequently, the Court accepted that it could presume, without carrying out a specific and 
individual examination of each of the documents drawn up in the context of preparing an 
impact assessment, that the disclosure of those documents would, in principle, seriously 
undermine its decision-making process developing a policy proposal as long as the 
Commission has either adopted or abandoned the policy initiative, regardless of whether the 
proposal is legislative or other in nature (paras 97-100). The Court referred to the Turco 
principles quoted above but stressed that despite the Commission’s right of legislative 
initiative, the legislative functions are allocated on the Parliament and the Council. Therefore, 
when preparing and developing a proposal for a legislative act, the Commission is not acting 
in a legislative capacity (paras 102-103). An appeal in ClientEarth is pending. In addition, 
there are a number of pending cases brought by Philip Morris involving Commission impact 
assessments and other preparatory documents predating the adoption of a formal legislative 
proposal.23  
 
2.2. Documents relating to administrative proceedings 
 
Emphasising the special character of legislative matters has created tempting opportunities 
for the institutions to draw clear lines in the sand for matters that fall outside this category 
as strictly defined. The implication is that the right to public access is less fundamental when 
exercised in the administrative context than in the legislative one.24 In our view, this 
reasoning is fundamentally erroneous and ignores in a self-interested fashion the original and 
leading purpose of public access legislation, namely to ensure that administrations open up. 
Legislative processes are usually not even addressed by public access legislation in national 
                                           
22 T-424/14 and T-425/14 ClientEarth v. the Commission. 
23 See Cases T-18/15 Philip Morris v Commission; Case T-520/13 Philip Morris Benelux v Commission; Case T-
796/14 Philip Morris v Commission; Case T-800/14 Philip Morris v Commission and the Order of the Court in 
Case C-520/13 Philip Morris Benelux v Commission.  
24 See eg case T-403/15 MyTravel v Commission [2008] ECR II-02027 at [49].  
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contexts. While it is certainly fundamental that secret legislative processes open up, this is 
usually done outside the scope of public access legislation altogether.25  
The relevant exceptions used for administrative matters (the exceptions relating to 
investigations and the ‘space to think’ exception) both include the ‘public interest’ test, but 
it seems that the Courts have struggled with elaborating what the general public interest in 
guaranteeing openness in EU administration might be. This matter is however directly 
addressed by the Preamble of the Regulation: ‘Openness enables citizens to participate more 
closely in the decision-making process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater 
legitimacy and is more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system’. 
Openness in administrative matters is something that the CJEU has also acknowledged as a 
matter of principle in its ruling in MyTravel. 
it is true that, as the Court has already stated, the administrative activity of the 
Commission does not require as extensive an access to documents as that concerning 
the legislative activity of a Union institution. However, that does not in any way mean 
[…] that such an activity falls outside the scope of Regulation No 1049/2001. Suffice 
it to note in that respect that Article 2(3) of that regulation states that the latter applies 
to all documents held by an institution, that is to say drawn up or received by it and 
in its possession, in all areas of Union activity.26 
But in practice this principle has been watered down in its jurisprudence concerning ‘general 
presumptions’ in administrative matters.  
The distinction between legislative and administrative matters is something that the CJEU 
referred to for the first time in TGI as a justification to reinforce the arguments introducing 
this doctrine; a strand of case law that permits the institutions to rely in relation to certain 
categories of administrative and court documents on a general presumption that their 
disclosure would undermine the purpose of the protection of an interest protected by the 
Regulation.27 As a result, the institutions are freed from examining the requested documents 
individually. The practical implication of the general presumptions doctrine is that the burden 
of proof is shifted from the institution, which may rely on non-disclosure unless the applicant 
is able to demonstrate that there will be no harm to the interest protected by the Regulation 
and thus that a document is not covered by a general presumption. This is difficult in practice 
given that the applicant has not seen the document. The logic driving the development is 
most likely that administrative procedures usually only involve individual litigants, and the 
direct public dimension is thus weaker.  
General presumptions of secrecy have now been confirmed in case law, at the request of the 
Commission, for documents relating to state aid, mergers, court proceedings, cartels and 
infringement proceedings with two more cases involving presumptions pending.28 These were 
initially introduced in the context of very broad requests to files that related to private 
interests rather than public ones, but have since then been broadened to cover even narrow 
requests in matters where a public interest to publicity might be easily identifiable (see 
Section 2.3. below). This is a matter that has been raised in several appeals, but to which 
                                           
25 Deirdre Curtin, ’Judging EU Secrecy’, Cahiers de Droit Européen, 2012 (2) 459 – 490 at 481. 
26 Case C-506/08 P Sweden v the Commission (paras 87-88).  
27 Case C-139/07 P Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau EU:C:2010:376, paras 60-61. For an analysis of 
the development of the general presumptions doctrine see P Leino ‘Just a Little Sunshine in the Rain: The 2010 
case law of the European Court of Justice on Access to Documents’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 1215. 
28 See case C-139/07 P Commission v Technische Glaswerke Ilmenau EU:C:2010:376; Case C-404/10 P 
Commission v Éditions Odile Jacob EU:C:2012:393; Case C-514/07 P Sweden and Others v API and 
Commission EU:C:2010:541; Case C-365/12 P Commission v EnBW EU:C:2014:112 and Joined Cases C-
514/11 P and C-605/11 P LPN and Finland v Commission EU:C:2013:738. Two appeals are pending concerning 
the EU-Pilot procedure (Case C-562/14 P Sweden v Commission) and Commission impact assessment 
documents (C-57/16 P ClientEarth v Commission). 
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the Court has only been responsive in one case, the one brought by Carl Schlyter MEP,29 
which involved a detailed opinion of the Commission concerning a draft Order relating to the 
annual declaration of nanoparticle substances, notified by the French authorities to the 
Commission in accordance with the provisions of Directive 98/34/EC, and which the 
Commission refused to release. The procedure was essentially one aimed at providing 
information between the Member States and the Commission relating to national initiatives 
for technical standards.  While the relevant acts could constitute legislative acts at national 
level, at the EU level the procedure was an administrative one, managed by the Commission, 
and since the Commission found that the procedure could potentially result in infringement 
proceedings, it could be covered by the exception in Regulation No 1049/2001 relating to 
investigations. The Court rejected this argument with reference to its Turco jurisprudence. It 
ruled that the Commission’s detailed opinion delivered under the Directive 98/34 procedure 
’is a factor which will be taken into consideration by the national legislature when adopting 
the draft technical regulation’ and thus ‘the possibility for citizens to find out the 
considerations underpinning legislative action is a precondition for the effective exercise of 
their democratic rights’. Therefore, ‘the necessity of ensuring that a Member State is willing 
to cooperate with the Commission in a spirit of mutual trust does not constitute a legitimate 
reason for limiting transparency in the process for the adoption of a technical rule’ (para 72). 
An appeal by the French Government is however pending before the CJEU.30   
The Court has justified its doctrine of general presumptions with reference to how the 
Commission is not required to base its decision on that general presumption – instead, it 
‘may always carry out a specific examination of the documents covered by a request for 
access and provide such reasons’. And in case the matter involved ‘is of a nature which 
permits the full or partial disclosure of the documents in the file, it is obliged to make that 
disclosure’. However, the Court stresses,  
the requirement to ascertain whether the general presumption in question actually 
applies cannot be interpreted as meaning that the Commission must examine 
individually each document requested in the case. Such a requirement would deprive 
that general presumption of its proper effect, which is to permit the Commission to 
reply to a global request for access in a manner equally global.31  
The on-going expansion of the general presumptions doctrine eradicates the core principles 
of the Regulation on individual examination and widest access with strictly interpreted 
exceptions established in the early case law. This undermining takes place despite the fact 
that the Court itself acknowledges that:  
the possibility of relying on general presumptions applying to certain categories of 
documents, instead of examining each document individually and specifically before 
refusing access to it, is no insignificant matter. The effect of such presumptions is not 
only that they restrict the fundamental principle of transparency laid down in Article 11 
TEU, Article 15 TFEU and Regulation No 1049/2001, but also that they limit in practice 
access to the documents in question. Accordingly, the use of such presumptions must 
be founded on reasonable and convincing grounds.32  
The presumptions in practice remove a large bulk of administrative documents from the 
scope of public access under the Regulation without any clear basis in EU legislation, and in 
practice create access-free zones within the Commission, where its officials have the 
opportunity to administer in the fairly certain knowledge that most of their work will never 
                                           
29 Case T-402/12 Carl Schlyter v the Commission.  
30 Case C-331/15 P. 
31 Joined Cases C-514/11 P and C-605/11 P LPN and Finland v Commission EU:C:2013:738.  
32 Case T-306/12 Spirlea v the Commission para 52.  
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be in the public eye. What this access-free zone does to the administration is a matter that 
should be of public concern. 
 
2.3. Documents relating to Court proceedings 
 
Article 15 TFEU currently establishes that the Court of Justice is subject to the ordinary access 
to documents provisions only when exercising its administrative tasks. In August 2003, API 
– a non-profit-making organization of foreign journalists based in Belgium – applied to the 
Commission under Regulation 1049/2001 for access to the written pleadings lodged by the 
Commission before the General Court or the Court of Justice in proceedings relating to fifteen 
cases at different stages including the Open Skies cases. The Commission granted access 
only in respect of the pleadings lodged in two preliminary ruling cases. Access to two 
pleadings was refused essentially because the cases were pending. The same exception 
applied also to the pleadings of a closed case that was closely connected with another pending 
case. The Open Skies cases, again, were closed, but they concerned infringement 
proceedings and could thus, in the view of the Commission, be protected under the relevant 
exception. Finally, the Commission found that there was no overriding public interest in 
disclosure.33 The documents applied for clearly did fall within the scope of application of 
Regulation 1049/2001, in that they were documents either drawn up or received by the 
Commission and in its possession, and belonged to an area of activity of the European Union.  
 
However, the Court of Justice confirmed in its ruling that an institution may base its decisions 
on general presumptions which apply to certain categories of documents. For the Court,  
 
It is clear, both from the wording of the relevant provisions of the Treaties and from 
the broad logic of Regulation No 1049/2001 and the objectives of the relevant EU 
rules, that judicial activities are as such excluded from the scope, established by those 
rules, of the right of access to documents (para 79). 
 
While the exclusion of the documents from the scope of public access was, in principle, 
acceptable, the Court argued for a temporal limitation:  
 
the exclusion of judicial activities from the scope of the right of access to documents, 
without any distinction being drawn between the various procedural stages, is justified 
in the light of the need to ensure that, throughout the court proceedings, the exchange 
of argument by the parties and the deliberations of the Court in the case before it take 
place in an atmosphere of total serenity. (para 92) 
 
For this reason, it judged it appropriate that there should be ‘a general presumption that 
disclosure of the pleadings lodged by one of the institutions in court proceedings would 
undermine the protection of those proceedings … while those proceedings remain pending’. 
(para 94). In the Court's view, ‘disclosure would flout the special nature of that category of 
documents and would be tantamount to making a significant part of the court proceedings 
subject to the principle of transparency.’ Consequently, ‘the effectiveness of the exclusion of 
                                           
33 In Joined Cases C-514/07 P, C-528/07 P and C-532/07 P (Association de la presse internationale ASBL (API). 
For a discussion, see P Leino ‘Just a Little Sunshine in the Rain: The 2010 case law of the European Court of 
Justice on Access to Documents’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 1215. See too, D Curtin, ’Judging EU Secrecy’, Cahiers de 
Droit Européen, 2012 (2) 459 – 490 at 481. 
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the Court of Justice from the institutions to which the principle of transparency applies ... 
would be largely frustrated’ (para 95).  
 
As regards pleadings that had been lodged in closed cases, the Court pointed out that once 
proceedings have been closed by a decision of the Court, there are no longer grounds for 
presuming that disclosure of the pleadings would undermine the judicial activities of the Court 
and the ‘general presumption’ thus no longer applied. The Court then pointed out that the 
procedures provided for under 258 and 260 TFEU constitute two distinct procedures, each 
with its own subject-matter. Accordingly, as the General Court had found, it could not be 
presumed that disclosure of pleadings lodged in a procedure which ultimately led to the 
delivery of a judgment under Article 258 TFEU undermines investigations which could lead to 
proceedings being brought under Article 260 TFEU (para 122). 
 
The Court’s conclusion in API deferred to public pressure with reference to equality of arms: 
‘if the content of the Commission's pleadings were to be open to public debate, there would 
be a danger that the criticism levelled against them, whatever its actual legal significance, 
might influence the position defended by the Commission before the EU Courts’ (API, para 
86). Moreover, the Court proceedings themselves would be at risk: 
 
Disclosure of the pleadings in question would have the effect of exposing judicial 
activities to external pressure, albeit only in the perception of the public, and would 
disturb the serenity of the proceedings (para 93).  
 
As a matter of principle, the existence of yet another ‘general presumption’ in the API case 
is of course again significant and yet, it was the least astonishing: it is hardly surprising that 
the Court's interest in transparency was lacking when it came to its own documents. The API 
case was a case of mere institutional politics: the main question was about who should rule 
on access to documents relating to Court proceedings and not about the harm that granting 
access to the documents API had applied for might cause – even if assessing this harm ought 
to have been at the core of the case.  
After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Court has adopted a decision 
establishing rules concerning public access to the documents held by it in the exercise of its 
administrative functions.34 The rules only apply to documents relating to the Court’s 
administrative functions, which entails that there is no legal channel for citizens to apply for 
Court pleadings through the Court itself. The status of Court pleadings held by the other EU 
institutions – and more indirectly, those held by Member State authorities – remains to be 
assessed based on the API guidelines. There is currently an appeal pending before the CJEU 
concerning a Commission claim that unlike the Commission’s own submissions, a Member 
State’s written submissions must be regarded as documents of the Court of Justice and thus 
falling outside transparency rules under Article 15(3) TFEU and as such covered by the 
specific rules relating to access to judicial documents. According to the Commission, ‘[a]ny 
interpretation allowing access to a Member State’s written submissions would render both 
the fourth subparagraph of Article 15(3) TFEU and the specific rules relating to access to 
judicial documents meaningless’.35 
As Advocate General Maduro noted in his Opinion in API, the practice of various international 
tribunals suggests that there is no reason to fear that disclosure of documents relating to 
                                           
34 Decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 11 December 2012 concerning public access to 
documents held by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the exercise of its administrative functions 
(2013/C 38/02). 
35 Case T-188/12 Breyer v the Commission, para 66. For the appeal, see Case 213/15 P.  
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judicial proceedings will undermine the judicial process: all submissions are public unless 
there are exceptional reasons for keeping them confidential.36 Moreover, disclosure of 
procedural documents is possible in a number of Member States and that it is also provided 
for, as regards documents lodged with the European Court of Human Rights, in the ECHR. 
This approach would seem to coincide with the basic principle of Regulation No 1049/2001. 
In this respect, Advocate General Maduro also notes the ‘tendency seems to be that the more 
remote the judicial body, the greater its concern with the transparency of its judicial 
proceedings’ (para 26). This might not be a bad perspective to consider for the Court of a 
Union constantly struggling with challenges relating to a democratic deficit. 
 
2.4. Infringement proceedings and EU Pilot cases 
 
General presumptions against disclosure are particularly troublesome in the context of 
infringement documents and documents relating to EU Pilot procedures, which are matters 
addressed in the rulings in LPN and Spirlea. While infringement and EU Pilot files are often 
initiated following information received from private claimants, these procedures are more 
broadly related to the implementation of EU legislation, which is matter of general concern. 
In practice, infringement and EU Pilot files can be expected to build on national legislative 
documents, such as government proposals relating to the implementation of EU legislation, 
much of which is already in the public domain. This is specifically the point raised in the 
appeal in the LPN case: that general presumptions could not be transferred to documents 
relating to an infringement procedure: and that these procedures differ as regards their 
material content, scope, the sensitivity of the case and the legitimate interest in gaining 
access to information relating to it.  
The Court’s decision in LPN is particularly worrying considering the context in which it was 
established: in an infringement procedure related to conservation of the environment, 
keeping in mind that environmental information is also governed by the regulation on the 
application of the Århus Convention.37 The application was brought by LPN, a Portuguese 
environmental NGO, which requested two documents relating to pending infringement 
proceedings, which concerned the compatibility of a dam construction project with the EU 
Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC). The Commission refused to grant access to the documents 
with reference to how in an infringement procedure a climate of mutual trust was needed 
between the Commission and the relevant Member State in order to start a process of 
negotiation and compromise with a view of reaching an amicable settlement of the dispute 
and avoiding litigation. The General Court had acknowledged that the Commission review 
under infringement proceedings fell within its administrative function, and the latter enjoyed 
wide discretion.38  
The CJEU was not convinced. In its view, ‘infringement procedures are regarded […] as a 
type of procedure which, as such, has characteristics precluding full transparency being 
granted in that field and which therefore has a special position within the system of access 
to documents’ (para 55). In addition, the Court argued, the infringement procedure has 
characteristics which are comparable to those of a State aid review procedure where it had 
previously confirmed the existence of a general presumption: both are procedures initiated 
in respect of the Member State responsible, either for granting aid for alleged infringement 
of EU law. Moreover, under neither of the two procedures the interested parties with the 
exception of the relevant Member State enjoy a right to consult the documents on the 
                                           
36 A.G. Maduro’s Opinion in API, para 26. 
37 Joined Cases C-514/11 P and C-605/11 P LPN and Finland v the Commission.  
38 Case T-29/08 LPN v Commission. 
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Commission’s administrative file, and that granting access to them would call the system into 
question (paras 56-59).  The Court referred to its settled case-law that the ‘purpose of the 
pre-litigation procedure is to give the Member State concerned an opportunity, on the one 
hand, to comply with its obligations under European Union law and, on the other, to avail 
itself of its right to defend itself against the objections formulated by the Commission’ (para 
62):   
The disclosure of the documents concerning an infringement procedure during its pre-
litigation stage would, in addition, be likely to change the nature and progress of that 
procedure, given that, in those circumstances, it could prove even more difficult to 
begin a process of negotiation and to reach an agreement between the Commission 
and the Member State concerned putting an end to the infringement alleged, in order 
to enable European Union law to be respected and to avoid legal proceedings (para 
63).  
Finally, the Court established that the documents relating to the pre-litigation stage of an 
infringement procedure constitute a single category of documents for the purposes of 
applying the abovementioned general presumption.  
After the success in LPN, it was no surprise that the Commission subsequently moved to 
invoke a general presumption of secrecy in the context of an EU Pilot procedure, and the 
General Court accepted its existence in Spirlea.39 An appeal is pending before the CJEU.40 The 
General Court acknowledged that the EU Pilot Procedure   
is a procedure which precedes the commencement of the pre-litigation stage of 
infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU. It may address the proper application 
of EU law or the compatibility of national legislation with provisions of EU law. It may 
be initiated as a result of a complaint made by a citizen or on the Commission’s own 
initiative. If, during an EU Pilot procedure, information comes to light which indicates 
an infringement of EU law, the Commission may send requests for information to the 
Member State concerned and may even call on it to put an end to the irregular situation 
or indeed request the Member State to adopt appropriate measures to ensure 
compliance with EU law. The objective of the EU Pilot procedure is to help resolve 
possible infringements of EU law by the Member States swiftly and effectively and, 
where possible, without having recourse to infringement proceedings under Article 258 
TFEU (para 55) . 
For this reason, the Court acknowledged that the ‘ratio decidendi adopted by the Court in 
LPN v Commission […] and the similarities between the EU Pilot procedure and infringement 
procedures under Article 258 TFEU militate in favour of the recognition of that presumption’: 
therefore,  
the element unifying the Court’s reasoning in all of the judgments concerning access to 
documents in investigation procedures in which a general presumption of refusal of 
access was recognised is that access is wholly incompatible with the proper conduct of 
those procedures and is likely to jeopardise their outcome […]That unifying element is 
equally applicable to EU Pilot procedures, in which a general presumption is, essentially, 
dictated by the need to ensure the proper conduct of such procedures and to ensure 
that their purpose is not undermined (para 57).  
While the two procedures are not identical and the EU Pilot procedure is not expressly 
acknowledged by the Treaties, their purposes are the same, and an EU Pilot procedure may 
well lead to an infringement procedure:  
                                           
39 Case T-306/12 Spirlea v the Commission.  
40 Case C-562/14 P Sweden v the Commission.  
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Since the preservation of confidentiality during the pre-litigation phase of an 
infringement procedure has been recognised in the case-law, that same confidential 
treatment is justified, a fortiori, in EU Pilot procedures, the sole purpose of which is to 
avoid the lengthier and more complex infringement procedure and, where appropriate, 
the necessity of bringing an action for failure to fulfil obligations.  Consequently, the 
Court must conclude that, when the institution concerned invokes the exception 
relating to investigations provided for in the third indent of Article 4(2) of Regulation 
No 1049/2001, it may rely on a general presumption in order to refuse access to the 
documents relating to an EU Pilot procedure, that procedure constituting a stage prior 
to the possible formal initiation of an infringement procedure (para 62-63). 
What is particularly troublesome with these two general presumptions is that they are 
matters that influence national practices, and have the potential of moving matters that have 
already been in the public domain back under a secrecy regime. The attitude of the 
Commission has already provoked discussion in Sweden, and there is a ruling by the Finnish 
Supreme Administrative Court which builds on the Commission interpretation and denies 
access to EU Pilot documents following the Commission position on the matter.41 In both of 
these countries, infringement and EU Pilot files have previously been treated as broadly public 
under national FOI legislation.  
 
2.5. Protection of privacy 
 
There are two main pieces of legislation that try to strike a balance between public 
information and the protection of privacy. Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation No 1049/2001 
establishes that an exception to public access is to apply ‘where disclosure would undermine 
the protection of privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with 
Community legislation regarding the protection of personal data’. In addition, Regulation No 
45/2001, adopted on the basis of ex Article 286 EC (now replaced, in substance, by Art. 16 
TFEU), includes a number of provisions on the matter. The two regulations were negotiated 
simultaneously and acknowledge each other’s existence.42 However, the two regulations have 
also certain provisions that conflict: while Regulation No 1049/2001 does not mention any 
requirement of consent by the data subject, grants universal access to the released 
information, and specifically denies any need to reason one’s request, Regulation 45/2001 
requires the consent of the data subject, grants access only to the applicant, and requires 
reasons for the application. The Court’s rulings in Bavarian Lager, Schecke and Dennekamp 
II concern this specific question. 
The Bavarian Lager dispute pre-dates Regulation No 1049/2001, since the first access 
request was made based on the earlier Code of Conduct concerning public access to Council 
and Commission documents.43 Before the entry into force of Regulation No 1049/2001 the 
request had already resulted in a case before the General Court44 and the European 
                                           
41 See the decision of the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court of 23 January 2014.  
42 Recital 15 of Regulation No 45/2001 indicates that access to documents, including those containing personal 
data, is governed by Art. 255 EC, while Recital 11 of Regulation No 1049/2001 underlines that the institutions 
should take account of the principles in Community legislation concerning the protection of personal data in all 
areas of activity of the Union. For a discussion of the two regulations, see Kranenborg, “Access to documents 
and data protection in the European Union: on the public nature of personal data”, 45 CML Rev. (2008), 1079-
1114. 
43 O.J. 1993, L 340/41.  
44 Case T-309/97, Bavarian Lager v. Commission [1999] ECR II-3217. For a discussion, see P Leino ‘Just a Little 
Sunshine in the Rain: The 2010 case law of the European Court of Justice on Access to Documents’ (2011) 48 
CML Rev 1215. 
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Ombudsman.45 It concerned access to the names of persons acting in their professional 
capacity who had participated in a meeting organized by the Commission with an interest 
group and UK Government officials on 11 October 1996 in the context of infringement 
proceedings. The question later addressed by the CJEU following a further request for access 
was whether the process to be followed in granting such access was that of Regulation No 
1049/2001 – under which the request was made - or under the relevant data protection 
rules, since the requested documents included personal data, in particular the names of the 
persons attending the meeting. The Court cases concerned five names that had been blanked 
out from the minutes of the meeting, following two express refusals by persons to consent 
to the disclosure of their identity and the Commission’s failure to contact the remaining three 
attendees. In the Commission's view, Bavarian Lager had not established an express and 
legitimate purpose or need for the disclosure. In any case, the Commission argued that it 
would need to refuse to disclose the other names so as not to compromise its ability to 
conduct inquiries. 
In its ruling, the Court of Justice notes that the two regulations do not contain any provisions 
granting one regulation primacy over the other. In principle, ‘their full application should be 
ensured’ (para 56, emphasis added). However, when a request based on Regulation 
1049/2001, in fact, ’seeks to obtain access to documents including personal data, the 
provisions of Regulation No 45/2001 become applicable in their entirety’ (para 63). For the 
ECJ, it was enough that the names included in the relevant documents enabled the persons 
concerned to be identified. The Court pointed out that Bavarian Lager could have access to 
all the information concerning the meeting, including the opinions which those contributing 
expressed in their professional capacity, and that the Commission had sought the agreement 
of all the participants to the disclosure of their names. In the view of the Court, the 
Commission had been right to verify whether the data subjects had given their consent to 
the disclosure of personal data concerning them (para 75): ‘By releasing the expurgated 
version of the minutes of the meeting of 11 October 1996 with the names of five participants 
removed therefrom, the Commission did not infringe the provisions of Regulation No 
1049/2001 and sufficiently complied with its duty of openness’ (para 76). The CJEU also 
concluded that as Bavarian Lager had not provided ‘any express and legitimate justification 
or any convincing argument in order to demonstrate the necessity for those personal data to 
be transferred’, the Commission had not been able to weigh up the various interests of the 
parties concerned. Nor was it able to verify whether there was any reason to assume that 
the data subjects’ legitimate interests might be prejudiced, as required by Article 8(b) of 
Regulation No 45/2001” (para 78). Consequently, the Commission was right to reject the 
application for access to the full minutes of the meeting of 11 October 1996.  
An interesting characteristic of the case is that the CJEU’s ruling goes directly against the 
view of the European Data Protection Supervisor, who had consistently supported the 
applicant and the reading of the General Court and held that the Commission took too strict 
an approach. According to the EDPS, actual harm to privacy should always be a necessary 
threshold to justify refusal of access to documents containing personal details.46 The ruling 
in Bavarian Lager affects a great number of applications: after all, many documents include 
some kind of personal data. And as the European Data Protection Supervisor has pointed 
out, the effects of the approach will be difficult to administer, since a name is seldom included 
                                           
45 Reference 713/98/IJH. In his special report of November 2000, the Ombudsman recommended that the 
Commission should inform the applicant of the names of the CBMC delegates who had attended the meeting 
and of companies and persons in the 14 categories identified in the original request. 
46 See “Review of relationship between transparency and data protection more urgent after Court ruling on 
Bavarian Lager”, press release by the European Data Protection Supervisor, 30 June 2010. Available on the 
EDPS website at 
<www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/EDPS/PressNews/Press/2010/EDPS-
2010-11_ECJ_Bavarian_Lager_EN.pdf> 
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in a document on its own, but is linked to other data. It is highly doubtful whether particular 
data can be considered in isolation.47 The Court’s Grand Chamber later delivered another 
similar ruling in Schecke48 in which the CJEU declared void those provisions that required the 
publication of names of natural persons that receive agricultural aid. The justification given 
for this far-reaching conclusion is that these provisions were in conflict with the right of 
private life and protection of personal data included in the EU Charter. There was, yet again, 
no consideration of the harm caused, nor of the fact that the data was already legally in the 
public domain.  
Finally, in Dennekamp II the General Court rejected the applicant’s arguments regarding the 
necessity of having the names of MEPs participating in the Parliament’s additional pension 
scheme transferred in order to inform the public and enable participation in the debate on 
the legitimacy of the scheme, while accepting the applicant’s arguments regarding the 
necessity of bringing to light possible conflicts of interest of the MEPs. The Court confirmed 
the need to demonstrate the necessity of the transfer of personal data. 49 Even though the 
Court granted that Article 4(1)(b) does not prohibit the justification of the transfer of data 
on the basis of a general objective such as the public’s right to information, in practice the 
threshold for establishing the necessity was set quite high and the public’s right to 
information was not considered enough to satisfy the criterion. The GC emphasized the need 
to evaluate the appropriateness and proportionality of the transfer of the data in relation to 
the applicant’s objective.50   
But from the perspective of Regulation No 1049/2001, quite crucially, the Court jurisprudence 
does not give any consideration to whether granting access to the requested names in fact 
constituted an infringement of privacy. After all, everyone present at the famous Bavarian 
Lager meeting of 11 October 1996 was there in a public capacity, and one could assume that 
very little that could be characterized as ‘private’ affecting the participant’s integrity took 
place at the meeting. The same applies to Schecke, which does not seem to involve a 
situation where a person's personal integrity would seem to be seriously at risk. The same 
argument could be made in Dennekamp: it is unclear whether the case concerned privacy or 
integrity of the individual at all given that the data related to persons in public life acting in 
their public roles and the use of public funds.  
There is some new case law where the Court has accepted that the applicants have indeed 
been able to demonstrate the ‘necessity’ of processing personal data, with reference to ‘the 
existence of a climate of suspicion of EFSA, often accused of partiality because of its use of 
experts with vested interests due to their links with industrial lobbies, and on the necessity 
of ensuring the transparency of EFSA’s decision-making process’.51 The Court accepted that  
the disclosure of that information was, in that context, necessary to ensure the 
transparency of the process of adoption of a measure likely to have an impact on the 
activities of economic operators, in particular, in order to appreciate how the form of 
participation by each expert in that process might, through that expert’s own scientific 
opinion, have influenced the content of that measure (para 55). 
 
The Court referred to its Turco, MyTravel, Access Info and In’t Veld case law and argued 
that  
                                           
47 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents O.J. 
2009, C 2/03, para 48.  
48 Joined cases Volker und Markus Schecke GbR (C-92/09) and Hartmut Eifert (C-93/09) v. Land Hessen. 
49 Case T-115/13 Dennekamp v European Parliament (Dennekamp II) EU:T:2015:497, para 63. 
50 Ibid, paras 59 and 68.  
51 Case C-615/13 P ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA.  
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The transparency of the process followed by a public authority for the adoption of a 
measure of that nature contributes to that authority acquiring greater legitimacy in 
the eyes of the persons to whom that measure is addressed and increasing their 
confidence in that authority  (para 56).  
 
The Court accepted that ‘obtaining the information at issue was necessary so that the 
impartiality of each of those experts in carrying out their tasks as scientists in the service of 
EFSA could be specifically ascertained’ and subsequently set aside the General Court ruling. 
While the ruling is important from a transparency point-of-view, it is noteworthy that it still 
builds entirely on the interpretation of the data protection rules.  
 
2.6. International relations 
 
Recently there has been case law relating to the interpretation of the international relations 
exception. The first case concerned a Council Legal Service opinion on the proposed legal 
basis of the draft Council decision to authorise the Commission to launch negotiations for the 
SWIFT agreement brought by Sophie In’t Veld, MEP52 The document contained legal advice 
concerning the choice of legal basis and EU competence. In’t Veld received partial access.53 
The Council lost the case in General Court and appealed to the CJEU, which delivered its 
ruling in July 2014,54 dismissing the Council appeal in its entirety. Both Courts rejected the 
Council’s arguments concerning the sensitivity of its legal advice in a similar way as when 
the Council presented them in the legislative context. Both Courts acknowledged that the 
considerations relating to citizen participation and the legitimacy of administration are of a 
particular relevance where the Council is acting in its legislative capacity. However, the 
General Court stressed that the importance of transparency could not ‘be ruled out in 
international affairs, especially where a decision authorising the opening of negotiations 
involves an international agreement which may have an impact on an area of the European 
Union’s legislative activity’ (para 89). The General Court particularly emphasised the 
substance of the envisaged agreement, which concerned the processing and exchange of 
information in the context of police cooperation, with potential effects on the protection of 
personal data, which is a fundamental right, and something that the Council was obliged to 
consider when establishing whether the general interest relating to greater transparency 
justified the full or wider disclosure of the requested document (para 92). The CJEU confirmed 
that the fact that a document does not relate to a legislative procedure does not entail that 
no examination would be necessary, keeping in mind that the non-legislative activity of the 
institutions also falls under the scope of the Regulation.  The General Court also considered 
specifically the effect of the on-going procedure for concluding the international agreement 
and established that this was not conclusive in ascertaining whether an overriding public 
interest justifying disclosure existed: 
Indeed, the public interest in the transparency of the decision-making process would 
become meaningless if, as the Commission proposes, it were to be taken into account 
only in those cases where the decision-making process has come to an end (para 101). 
In conclusion, both Courts stressed the importance of protecting those elements that could 
reveal the strategic objectives pursued by the EU in the negotiations but established that 
                                           
52 Case T-529/09, Sophie in ’t Veld v the Council supported by the Commission (In ‘t Veld I). 
53 Paras 10 and 15 of the contested Council decision. 
54 Case C-350/12 P Council v Sophie in’t Veld.  
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outside these parts, the Council had not demonstrated how, ’specifically and actually’, harm 
to the public interest in the field of international relations existed.  
The second case brought by Sophie in ‘t Veld concerned a Commission decision to refuse 
access to certain documents relating to the famous draft international Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement,55 which the EP later refused to give its consent to and criticised for a lack 
of transparency in the negotiation process.56 The appeal by Sophie In’t Veld in this case 
related more clearly to documents produced during the international stage of negotiations 
and not merely internal decision-making within the EU. Consequently, the General Court 
proved more responsive to the Commission concerns. The General Court emphasised the 
‘particularly sensitive and essential nature of the interests’ relating to international relations, 
which gives the decisions on access ‘a complex and delicate nature which calls for the exercise 
of particular care’ and presumes ‘some discretion’ (para 108). 
A particular characteristic of this case related to the agreement among the various 
negotiating partners that matters would remain confidential, and whether the Commission in 
fact had the right to consent to such a solution, keeping in mind the transparency obligations 
it has under the Treaties. This question has been raised both before the General Court and 
the European Ombudsman. The Court did not address the appropriateness of confidentiality 
agreements, but accepted that the confidentiality commitment had not been specifically 
invoked by the Commission, that its refusal had been legally based on Article 4(1)(a), and 
that the disclosure of EU positions in international negotiations could indeed damage the 
protection of the public interest as regards international relations. This could happen by 
indirectly disclosing the positions of other parties to the negotiations. Alternatively, EU 
positions are 
by definition, subject to change depending on the course of those negotiations, and on 
concessions and compromises made in that context by the various stakeholders. As 
has already been noted, the formulation of negotiating positions may involve a number 
of tactical considerations of the negotiators, including the European Union itself. In 
that context, it is possible that the disclosure by the European Union, to the public, of 
its own negotiating positions, even though the negotiating positions of the other parties 
remain secret, could, in practice, have a negative effect on the negotiating position of 
the European Union (para 125). 
The Court also held that the unilateral disclosure of positions by one party may be likely to 
seriously undermine the mutual trust which is essential to the effectiveness of negotiations, 
the maintenance of which is a very delicate exercise in the context of international relations 
(para 126). Finally, since the international relations exception was mandatory and thus 
involved no public interest test, ‘any argument based on an overriding public interest in 
disclosure must be rejected as ineffective’ (para 131). The ruling in In’t Veld II is extremely 
detailed, following the Court’s examination of the requested documents and ruling on the 
parts that the Council should have handed out.  
The third and final case involving an international agreement was brought by Professor 
Leonard Besselink concerning a draft negotiating mandate, the draft Council Decision 
authorising the Commission to negotiate the EU Accession Agreement to the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).57 The Court found that the Council had interpreted the 
exceptions too broadly. It could not be used to justify a refusal to hand out the negotiation 
directive, which concerned the protocols to which the EU was seeking to accede, especially 
                                           
55 Case T-301/10, Sophie in ‘t Veld v the Commission (In ‘t Veld II). 
56 See European Parliament written declaration 12/2010 on the lack of a transparent process for the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and potentially objectionable content. 
57 Case T-331/11, Leonard Besselink v the Council. 
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since the matter was not subject to negotiations and the contents of the said directive had 
been communicated to the EU’s negotiating partners. But the Court accepted that even if 
some parts of the other negotiating directives had been published, their precise content had 
not been previously disclosed, and could have been exploited by the EU’s negotiating 
partners, thus establishing a risk to the EU’s international relations. The Court did not discuss 
the fact that unlike in the ACTA case described above, the EU’s negotiating partner, the 
Council of Europe, had in fact been exceptionally open and placed all its negotiating directives 
on the internet, which should have had some effect on the need to maintain a climate of 
confidence. But the Court did establish that those parts of the directives which merely 
referred to the principles that should govern the relevant negotiations, such as those 
contained in Article 6(2) TEU and Protocol 8, or the list of questions to be addressed in the 
negotiations should have been handed out. 
Overall the existing jurisprudence demonstrates that both the Council and the Commission 
have seen the international relations exception as a broad one. The Court has shown 
sensitivity to these claims and acknowledged that a certain discretion in applying the 
exception exists, but also as a rule established that the institutions have implemented the 
provision too broadly, in particular in In’t Veld I and Besselink. Finally, an important feature 
of this jurisprudence concerns the substance of all of the relevant agreements. They are 
fundamentally important international agreements that have implications for the life of 
individual citizens, which should have implications for the applicable transparency 
requirements. A key element in the recent jurisprudence is the General Court’s recognition 
that even if international relations do not fall under legislative matters, transparency still has 
a function and its requirements must be taken into account. These cases have also 
demonstrated that international relations should not as a policy field be treated as a 
categorical exception, and that there are matters where – despite the fact that they formally 
fall under international relations – it should be possible to take into account the public interest 
relating to transparency, especially if the possible harm of disclosure seems limited or rather 
hypothetical. 
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3. CURRENT AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 
In the context of this short briefing note we have raised a number of core issues in terms of 
fundamental changes that have occurred since the adoption of the Access Regulation some 
fifteen years ago in the legal context of openness at the level of the EU, in particular in the 
provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon. At the same time we have highlighted through a number 
of core issues some, at times conflicting strands, in the case law of the Courts in Luxembourg 
that have enabled litigants to raise issues that they have encountered in practice especially 
over the course of the past seven years since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force. This is 
by no means meant to be an exhaustive overview but is necessarily selective.  
Our approach in this penultimate section is to summarise a number of key themes that can 
be considered as both current and future challenges. At the same time we raise a number of 
other challenges both in terms of procedure, scope and substance that are in our view of 
primordial importance in trying to take the issue of openness in the EU further at this 
particularly crucial stage in its evolution. 
It is helpful at this stage in our view to go back to first principles. Access to documents or 
freedom of information legislation is generally designed to enable the public in one form or 
another to gain access to documents from the administration about its more general rule-
making functions (as opposed to privileged party access in specific individual case, which is 
guaranteed by Article 41 CFR and should be secured by EU legislation). This was the original 
motivation for three institutions –the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament- 
to voluntarily assume access to documents rules after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty 
in 1992. Even at that time – some 24 years ago- these three institutions operating at the 
supranational level had not only differing degrees of administration but also were all involved 
in different stages of the legislative process as such. From the very beginning the access to 
documents provisions were meant to apply to both documents in the realm of administration 
as well as in the realm of legislation.  
One of the distinguishing features of the supranational level compared to the national level 
is that EU legislative processes have been notoriously closed. This had to do with the fact 
that traditionally the Council of Ministers adopted EU legislation by negotiating behind closed 
doors between the representatives of the Member States. It was only since 1992 that the 
European Parliament has gradually acquired a stronger and more equal role in the legislative 
process, reaching its pinnacle in the Treaty of Lisbon with a full and equal power of co-
decision (with limited exceptions). One way that the European Parliament has contributed in 
recent years to establishing the outer limits of access to legislative documents, in particular 
of the Council and the Commission, has been through cases brought by individual MEPs under 
the existing Access Regulation (including Hautala, Turco, In ‘t Veld and Schlyter). This has 
been supplemented by ‘test cases’ brought by NGO’s or individuals (Access Info Europe, LPN, 
ClientEarth, Besselink and De Capitani). 
The reason may well be that in the vacuum of a failure to agree the terms of revision of the 
access Regulation (and in particular the perceived attempted ‘watering down’ of the existing 
status quo by the Commission and the Council in particular) there was no other way for 
individual MEPs to challenge denials of access to documents in general legislative processes 
or quasi-legislative processes than through the Courts and the direct route provided in the 
Access Regulation in particular. Many of these cases (in particular In’t Veld) also illustrate 
failures to guarantee the Parliament interinstitutional (privileged) access to Council and 
Commission documents when this would be necessary for the Parliament to exercise its 
Treaty-based functions. 
These cases have emphasised the fundamental nature of access to documents that are part 
of the legislative process and in particular in Turco and Access Info Europe the Court has 
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been categorical as to the democratic foundations of the right of access to documents in this 
context. It does not follow however that access to documents of an administrative nature are 
not covered by the Access Regulation. This is a key challenge in the coming period as the 
CJEU faces appeals from rulings of the General Court that conclude otherwise. This issue is 
particularly important in the context of access to Commission documents where many of the 
activities of the Commission are ‘administrative’ and managerial in nature and may well 
involve contacts with Member States, including in particular infringement cases and EU pilot 
procedures, where the Courts’ recent case law creates presumptions of secrecy for 
documents that have already been lawfully in the public domain and are related to the 
legislative procedure at either EU or national level or both.  
The implication in some of the recent case law is the assumption that there is a lesser public 
interest in openness when it comes to administrative activities as opposed to legislative 
activities. Public access to documents of a public administration concerns matters that are in 
the general public interest and does not just involve a bilateral relationship between the 
administration and the person or organization seeking access. This is a particularly important 
challenge in the context of the varied nature of the (non-legislative) administration by the 
Commission in particular which stretches well beyond the more familiar terrain of 
infringement actions, state aids, competition law to more novel areas of administration at 
the supranational level (for example in the context of the European Semester or of migration 
or other data-bases).  
Another challenge (that is being appealed at present) relates to legislative impact 
assessments and public access in that regard. Impact assessments are a decisive stage with 
major implications for legislative outcomes. In our view it is the public interest in access that 
should be leading when there is no compelling reason for secrecy. Moreover, there should be 
no presumption of secrecy but of openness and any compelling need for secrecy should be 
construed as narrowly as possible and also limited in time. 
Challenges remain also in the arena of public access to documents in the legislative sphere. 
Most prominently these relate to early stage agreements (trilogues) which is being litigated 
before the CJEU at present as well as being subject to an Ombudsman own initiative enquiry. 
One of the challenges for the future is for the European Parliament to pro-actively make 
available online the documents under discussion in this context, both in real time and ex post 
facto. The new Interinstitutional agreement (IIA) on better regulation places the three 
institutions under an obligation to ‘ensure the transparency of legislative procedures, on the 
basis of relevant legislation and case-law, including an appropriate handling of trilateral 
negotiations’ (para 38). It also refers to the need to develop ‘platforms and tools to that end, 
with a view to establishing a dedicated joint database on the state of play of legislative files ‘. 
This is one of the areas where the Parliament can lead by doing. 
In this context it is particularly important that the Parliament is also perceived as being led 
more by a presumption of openness rather than a presumption of secrecy. As far as the 
Council is concerned, case law now establishes that access to Member State positions and 
legal service opinions should be secured already while the legislative procedure is on-going, 
but the Council practice remains restrictive and its Rules of Procedure have not been updated 
to reflect the recent jurisprudence. The Council Register remains difficult to use and it is 
currently complicated to find documents relating to legislative procedures without detailed 
data about the relevant document. Without a comprehensive and well-function register with 
user-friendly search tools it is also difficult to get an overall picture of the proportion of 
legislative documents that are in fact subject to direct access under Article 12 of the Access 
Regulation.  
In the context of creating a joint database on legislative files, the Parliament should also 
stress the importance of creating comprehensive registers even for other than legislative 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 24 
matters. The fact that many institutions – in particular the Commission – do not have 
comprehensive and public registers makes making access to documents difficult for citizens, 
but also create an additional administrative burden by making it difficult to identify the 
requested documents. 
In this context the Parliament should re-consider its own rules on its own documents and 
broaden their scope in particular as regards documents that are currently considered its 
internal documents and documents drawn up by individual Members or political groups, and 
that currently constitute ‘Parliament documents’ for the purposes of access to documents 
only if they are tabled under the Rules of Procedure. Such documents may be significant from 
policy development point of view, and should in that case be subject to public access rule 
and the principle of transparency unless their disclosure would cause harm.  
The institutional scope of application of Regulation 1049/2001 should be updated to 
correspond to the requirements of the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty allows an access-free 
zone only in terms of the ECB and EIB in terms of their policy-making activities and the CJEU 
in terms of adjudication. That the Council currently proposes similar access-free zones for 
Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutors Office is in violation of the Treaty. These 
proposals are currently discussed in the Parliament and should be rejected.  
We further question whether in the longer term it remains justified for the ECB to be excluded 
from the provisions of the Access Regulation with regard to its policy-making and other tasks; 
the need for secrecy in the different contexts within which it operates can be sufficiently 
justified on the basis of the exceptions to the general rule. We believe that this is an issue 
for the next Treaty amendment process as is the general exemption contained for the CJEU. 
In the meantime, the CJEU should be encouraged to facilitate more pro-actively access to its 
own documents and the documents of intervening parties in a structured and transparent 
manner, except where the requirements of secrecy prevail. The right to a public and fair 
hearing is a right protected by key human rights instruments and Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. We do not see grounds for categorically limiting access to documents 
relating to pending cases, also linked to the recent moves to allow secret evidence in the 
Court.   
Both international relations and the protection of privacy and integrity currently constitute 
mandatory exceptions in the Access Regulation. Therefore the application of these exceptions 
does not formally enable taking into consideration the public interest relating to disclosure 
through balancing. The existence of mandatory exceptions is not in line with international 
standards, including the new Council of Europe Convention that the Member States are 
signatories to (and many have also ratified).   
A major challenge lies in the area of international agreements both now and for the future. 
In recent years it has become obvious that international agreements can substitute legislation 
in many ways and in any event often have quasi-legislative effects for citizens. Progress has 
been made in this context both through Court challenges (eg In ‘t Veld) and through ongoing 
‘successes’ by the European Ombudsman in this context (for example in the context of TTIP). 
However we recommend that in the context of amending the existing Access Regulation the  
categorical nature of the exemption for ‘international relations’ is reconsidered in view of the 
institutional practice of adopting far-reaching rights and obligations for citizens through the 
medium of international agreements (in particular with the United States in recent years). 
The balance between transparency and data protection is currently too strongly tilted towards 
the latter and disregards the fact that transparency and openness are also fundamental rights 
that should override especially in situations where disclosure does not create harm for 
privacy. The need to re-consider this issue is imperative with the forthcoming entry into force 
of the new Data protection Regulation. Dialogue with the European Data Protection 
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Supervisor is crucial in striking the right balance between these two fundamental rights in a 
manner that does justice to the public interest as well as to specific private interests and 
account being taken of the public context in which persons (officials and others) operate. 
Finally with new legislation on access to documents it is timely to consider EU wide legislation 
on secrecy with horizontal rules on classification of documents that would replace the current 
discretionary internal rules of different institutions, organs, bodies and agencies. A major 
ongoing challenge is the fact that internal discretionary rules on document classification apply 
to remove whole categories of documents from the public domain even when it is not clear 
in whose ‘public’ (Union?) interest that is. The large category of limited documents 
(unclassified but controlled) documents even prevent national parliaments from discussing 
their content in public – a concrete undermining of democratic representation and hamper 
the effectiveness of national access to documents regimes. This represents a considerable 
challenge and one that would benefit from an open public debate and the legal form of EU 
wide legislation. 
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4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
• EU legislation on access to documents is seriously outdated both in terms of the 
Treaty of Lisbon and framing institutional practices by a range of EU institutions, organs, 
bodies and agencies operating across a wide-range of policy fields. The scope and 
substance of the legal framework need to be adjusted in line with Article 15 TFEU and 
Article 10 TEU. 
• The status quo is structurally inadequate. The CJEU is confronted with specific 
issues and outdated legislation on an ad hoc basis but cannot re-design the general 
system. Nor can the European Ombudsman, although her work is increasingly significant 
in bringing specific secretive practices to light and tackling them both on a case by case 
basis and more structurally through a growing number of own initiative enquiries. It is 
the democratic responsibility of the EU legislator to re-ignite the amendment of 
the legislative rules in line with the Treaty of Lisbon taking into account the changed 
institutional context to that which prevailed in 2008 when the Commission made its 
proposal. A new proposal is needed and the EP can lead the way in terms of substance. 
It can profitably do so by engaging in a dialogue in this regard with both the European 
Ombudsman and the European Data Protection Supervisor. 
• There should be no access-free zones either in terms of personal scope or in terms 
of substance (policy area or stage of procedure) apart from those specifically established 
by the Treaty. The general presumption is of openness in line with the Treaty. The Treaty 
recognises no general presumptions of secrecy (such as those recently introduced by 
the Commission and confirmed by the Court), only exceptions to the principle of 
openness that should be articulated also in terms of an evolving understanding of public 
interest. The Treaty allows an access-free zone only in terms of the ECB and EIB in 
terms of their policy-making activities and the CJEU in terms of adjudication. The fact 
that the Council currently proposes similar access-free zones for Eurojust and the 
European Public Prosecutors Office is in violation of the Treaty. 
• The institutional scope of application of Regulation 1049/2001 should be updated to 
correspond with the requirements of the Treaty of Lisbon. At the same time we question 
whether it remains justified for the ECB to be excluded from the provisions of the Access 
Regulation with regard to its policy-making and other tasks given the manner that these 
tasks have expanded both in law and in practice since 2008. We do not see why it 
requires a blanket exemption anymore – its justifiable need for secrecy in the different 
contexts within which it operates can be sufficiently guaranteed on the basis of the 
existing exceptions to the general rules on public access. 
• The CJEU should be encouraged to facilitate more pro-actively the access to its own 
documents and the documents of intervening parties in a structured and transparent 
manner, except where the requirements of secrecy should prevail (in particular as 
regards deliberations among the judges) in the public interest.  
• The European Parliament is in the best position to lead efforts to re-start the 
legislative procedure on reforming the Access Regulation. The drafting of a new 
proposal for a regulation could be undertaken by it and then forwarded to the 
Commission as a means of re-opening the debate. Formally it is the Commission that 
has to re-launch a (new) legislative procedure beyond the inadequate content of both 
its 2008 and its 2011 proposals for the reform of Regulation 1049/2001. The aim, almost 
seven years after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force, should be more ambitious. It 
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should be to broaden significantly the scope of the existing Access Regulation after the 
Treaty of Lisbon as well as to re-consider the ongoing need for mandatory exceptions 
that are not balanced in some way against the public interest. The scope of public 
interest in the contemporary EU needs some re-consideration in particular since 
its articulation in Court jurisprudence has remained vague and not always consistent. 
• The European Parliament could also lead by pro-actively creating a website that 
gathers documents that form part of early legislative procedures (trilogues) for public 
access and by encouraging the other institutions (especially the Commission) to set up 
comprehensive registers of documents.  
• Administrative documents (including documents relating to infringement and EU Pilot 
procedures) and documents relating to international relations should explicitly be 
subject to the general principle of transparency and should be released unless their 
disclosure can be verified to cause harm to the protected interests.  
• The balance between transparency and data protection is currently too strongly 
tilted towards the latter and disregards the fact that transparency and openness are 
also fundamental rights that should override especially in situations where disclosure 
does not create harm for privacy. The need to re-consider this issue is imperative with 
the forthcoming entry into force of the new Data protection Regulation and the 
subsequent need to update Regulation No 45/2001. 
• With new legislation on access to documents it is timely to consider EU wide legislation 
on secrecy with horizontal rules on classification of documents that would replace 
the current discretionary internal rules of different institutions, organs, bodies and 
agencies. 

